Economy, finances, management: topical issues of science and practical activity

LOHOSHA Roman – Doctor of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Agrarian Management, Vinnytsia National Agrarian University (21008, Vinnytsia, 3 Soniachna Str., email: lrv@vsau.vin.ua).

MAZUR Kateryna – Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Agrarian Management, Vinnytsia National Agrarian University (21008, Vinnytsia, 3 Soniachna Str., email: mazurk@vsau.vin.ua).

PIDVALNA Oksana – Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Agrarian Management, Vinnytsia National Agrarian University (21008, Vinnytsia, 3 Soniachna Str., email: pog@vsau.vin.ua).

Current state of the development of market relations in Ukraine should be considered in the context of conflict and contradictory consequences of market reforms. The main incentive for the realization of any economic relations is economic interest. The development of market relations without taking into account the criteria of efficiency and economic interest leads to significant losses not only for the contracting members, but also for the subjects of market relations. In turn, maximization of economic effects, even in conditions of perfect competition, leads to the opportunistic behavior of the members of contracting relations, the main regulators of which should be price and costly mechanisms. Opportunistic behavior arises precisely on the basis of interests’ conflict, and the losses arise as a result of impossibility to realize the coinciding interests.

The implementation of state programs and strategic imperatives in the development of the Ukrainian economy requires the development of such sectoral models of contractual relations which can provide, on the one hand, the efficiency of production of competitive products (services), and, on the other hand, the efficient interaction between the recipient groups of market agents. From this standpoint, the modeling of contractual relations should be considered as the direction of solving the existing problems in the economy both at the macro and microeconomic level. Herewith, the main tasks are to maximize the overall benefits and to prevent conflicts between the main recipient groups of market agents.

Creating the mechanisms of restricting opportunism responding contractual threat leads to the most rational and effective organization and coordination of the interaction of individuals with regard to the transfer of ownership for limited resources. The effectiveness is in the fact that the additional guarantees of the expected result of the interaction received by the contracting parties when creating the mechanisms of restricting opportunism are not less than the cost of their creation.

In the economic literature, the notion of the effectiveness of contractual relations is not fully disclosed at present. The issue of the content of the effectiveness of contractual relations remains controversial.

The process of contracting involves a description of the configuration of groups of agents that are determinants, recipients, and beneficiaries to the market. Based on this, a conflict of interest and the risks of opportunism assessed by individual groups of agents can be described, on which the market perfection objectively depends.

The essence of the conflict can be represented through a matrix, which involves the ratio of traditionally economic and socio-ecological priorities.

We also believe that the tasks, functions and principles of contracting of a market institution are essentially coordinates for the construction of a perfect contract type, which will provide the maximization of the positive effects and results. Thus, the previous criterion involves assessing the potential for market development, which is defined as unlimited. As follows, the general contract may vary within the "perfect – imperfect", where the first implies the availability of complete information about the consequences and the alternative, which the imperfect contract type lacks. We based on the assumption of the existence of a certain hybrid variant of the contract - conditionally perfect in the real economic environment, which provides the risks of perfect, as well as imperfect – the objective lack of ability to provide complete informative.

In its turn, a conventionally perfect contract may provide for two fundamental variations according to the criterion of maximizing the main effect – the added value participants of market relations in the network of restrictions on the criteria of market efficiency: 1) so-called "unfavorable choice" when market participants are not able to choose alternatives; 2) so-called "favorable choice", when there are alternatives, such are decoded and suitable for selection.

Thus, a model of a conditionally perfect contract of a favorable choice, the content of which, in all canonical constituents, corresponds to the principles of the ideology of economic liberalism, can be determined as the most suitable for market relations and functioning of the market institution in general. This means the obligatory set of certain functions and norms to be available in such a typical contract.

The advantages of a functional market contract over others are, above all, the ability to identify and realize the potential of existing market relations in the future. Such a contract is based on the algorithmization of the process of providing the maximization of market efficiency (market relations) as a regular process of synchronization and coordination of interests of participants on the basis of profitability criteria for all parties.

Therefore, in addition to economic content, market development implies direct social and environmental regulatory content due to the existence of different groups of economic agents that are recipient to the market, having different interests and expectations from the market. Hence, market contracting requires a special contractual regulation of the relations between the parties, where criteria of the efficiency have multidimensional content. The effectiveness of market contracting involves solving the managerial task of finding the optimal market state within the network of limitations, targets and functions, as well as compliance with the principles of reconciling the interests of all interested recipients with the preservation of motivation to improve market efficiency.

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